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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF

VT~:.'.~intiff-Respowient,

LAVELL ROBINSON,

I
(

Case No.
20338

Defendant-Appellant. }
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Lavell Robinson, appeals from a conviction for driving under the influence of intoxicating
liquor rendered by he Honorable Judge Leonard W.
Elton in the Third District Court for Salt Lake County.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant was convicted of driving under the
influence of intoxicating liquor by the Honorable Judge
Elton and sentenced to forty ( 40) days in Salt Lake
County Jail and fined $299.00. The sentence was sus1wnded upon the payment of $175.00
The Judge in this case wrote a memorandum decision in which he explained, " ... The court feels that
in this case, but for the results of the breath test, the
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verdict would have been diff ercnt. Neither the arresting officer's testimony or the testimony of the officer
administering the test as to Defendant's actions would
have been sufficiPnt by itself to find the Defendant
guilty."
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the conviction m the
lower court.
STATEMENT OF THE F Acrrs
This is a very important case of first impression
upon this court involving the question of the admissibilit:-', the validity, and the constitutionality of the breathal:-'zPr t0st as administPred in tlw case at har.
The appellant was ant•sted for driving under the influence of intoxicaing liquor following an accident involving a collision with a vehicle driven by Melvin Stauffer which resulted in over $500.00 damage to the front
end of appellant's vehicle. (Court transcript p. 15). Approximately hv'enty minutes prior to the accident th0
appellant had consumed two "scre·wdriver highballs"
during a period of approximately one-half honr. FollovYing the arrPst, tlw ap1wllant 1yas told that hE' could takP
a breath, hloocl, or nrirn• frst, and that he conld refus0
to talw th0 t0sts lrnt npon doing so he might lose hiP-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3

license for a period of a year (Court transcript p. 12).
The appellant therefor consented to take the breath tc>st
at the Redwood Station-approximately three-quaters
of an hour after the accident had occurred (Court transcript p. 13). The officer conducting the breathalyzer
test testified that he obtained a reading of .180 (it is
assumed, of course, that he meant he obtained a .180
reading on the machine which is, in reality, .180%.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE RESULTS OF THE BREATHALYZER TEST TO BE ADMITTED
INTO EVIDENCE SINCE A PROPER FOUNDATION WAS
NOT LAID FOR ITS ADMISSION.

B<>fore evidence of the resnlts of a breathal~7 zer test
can be entered into evidence, c<>rtain criteria concerning
the operation of the machine must be satisfied. It must
bti shown: (1) That the machine was properly checked
and in proper working order at the time of the conducting of the test; (2) that the chemicals used were the
corn'ct kind and compounded in the proper proportions;
(3) that the snhjPct had nothing in his mouth at the time
of tht> tPst and that he had eaten no food and taken no
drink ·within fiftPPn minutes prior to taking the test; (4)
that tlw t<'st was con<lncte<l hy a qualified operator in the
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proper manner. State v. Baker, 56 \¥ash. 846, 355 P. 2d
806, 809 (1960). The court further pointed out that the
state must produce prima facie evidence that each of the
four above requirements have bePn complied ·with before
the results of a breathalyzer test may be admitted into
(~vidence. The reasons for such precautions by the courts
becomes quite obvious when it is realized that the amount
of alcohol in the breath necessary to result in a reading
of .180% is 1/20,000 cubic centimeter in the entire 52.5
en. cm. of air in the breathalyzer cylinder. This is so
since there is the same amount in one cubic centimeter
of hlood as there is in 2100 cubic centimeter of breath.
Saying there is 18/10,000 cubic centimeter in one cubic
centinwtPr of blood ( .180%) means there is that sanw
amount in 2100 cubic centimeter of brt'ath or, in other
words, 18/400,000 cubic cpntimeter in the 52.5 cubic
rentimdPr hrr>athalyzt>r cylinder. This means that if a
iwrson had absolutely no alcohol in h1:s bloodstream, tlw
hreathal~-zt>r -.,rnnld still registE'r approximately .180% if
he had 1/10 cnhic cE'ntinwtt>r (approximatE"ly 1/300 of
a fluid oz.) in his mouth at tlw timP of the test.
There was no attempt on the part of the officers to
find out if the appellant had used any medication that
night nor did they check his month at the time of his
test. Tlwy based their decision in this area merely on the
fact that the arresting officer did not obst'rve the dt>frndant vomit. Considering the extremely small amount
of alcohol which would iwecl to hP in tliP mouth at tlw
tinw of th0 tPst in or<l<'l' to rPsnlt in a rt'ading- of .l807r,
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especially when the fact that the appellant wore false
teeth ·which may Pasily have trapped as much as 1/300
of a fluid oz. inside his mouth prior to the time of the
test, the failure of the state to produce prima facie evidence that this requirement was met ruled out the results
of the breathalyzer test and prejudicial error resulted
since the court based its decision solely on the results of
the breathalyzer test, deeming the other evidence comvl<:>tely insufficient to justify a conviction.
Secondly, the fourth requirement, as well as the
third requirement, was not met since Officer Jensen was
not adequately shown to be a qualified operator merely
lwcause he had taken a two \\'eek class from officer Gale
which included two days work with the br<:>athalyzn. He
admitted that he does not know how the machine operates
-merely that it do E's. Officer Jen sen and Officer Jens en
alonP gave thesE' tests to the defendant. The state failed
in an attempt to further show the competency of Officer
.Jensen' as-an operator. Officer Gale's testimony was only
that he had taught the class which Officer Jensen attended. He did not testify as having seen Officer Jensen
opNak one of thPse de,·ices, so his testimony that, in
his opinion, Officrr Jensen \Yas competent to conduct the
tc'st, was also insufficient to show prima
farie tl1at Offirer .J <:>nsrn was a qnalifi<:>d individual or
that l1P rornlnrtPd th(• t<•st in thr prop<:>r rnannrr.

ln·eathal~.,1,t,r
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POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE RESULTS OF THE BREATHALYZER TEST TO BE ADMITTED
INTO EVIDENCE SINCE THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO
EXTRAPOLATE THE RESULTS OF THE TEST BACK TO
THE TIME WHEN THE DEFENDANT WAS DRIVING HIS
AUTOMOBILE.

The prosecution's expert witness admitted that the
breathalyzer results only tell the quantity that is in the
blood stream at the time the test was given. It in no
·way, by itself, tells what the amount of alcohol in the
breath was, say, forty-five minutes later. It is the appellant's contention that the failure of the prosecution
to extrapolate the results back to the time the appellant
was driving his automobile rendered the results inadmissible in a prosecution for driving under the influence
of intoxicating liquor. The evidence in this case tended
to show that the appellant had had two "screwdriver
highballs" over a period of about half an hour-finishing
the last drink approximately twenty minutes prior to
the time of the accident. The state's expert witness on
the breathalyzer also stated that you would not reach an
equilibrium (that point where you are absorbing alcohol
into your blood stream at the same rate as you are dissipating it) until about forty-five minutes after you have
consumed the last drink. Prior to this time the alcohol
c.ontent in your hlood will he rising. There was no in-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7
formation placed into evidence however which would enable the court to make any decision as to the degree of
intoxication at the time the defendant was driving the
automobile.
The best way, although not the only way by any
means, that the prosecution could have extrapolated the
results back would have been to have produced a chart
into evidence by their expert witness, or some other
source, showing what amount of alcohol would have been
absorbed into the blood twenty minutes after the last
drink in comparison to the amount in the system (for the
amount of alcohol consumed-considering the build of
the appellant, the amount of food in his stomach, etc.)
sixty-five minutes after the last drink. This would have
adequately overcome the problem of extrapolating the
results back but, since the prosecution utterly failed to
do so, the court should not have based its decision on
the results of the breathal>-zer test and, in doing so, the
court created prejudicial error to the appellant.
POINT III
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE RESULTS OF THE BREATHALYZER TEST TO BE ADMITTED
INTO EVIDENCE SINCE THE TEST WAS THE RESULT
OF COERSION AND WAS, THEREFORE, TAKEN IN VIOLATION OF U.C.A. 41-6-44.10 AND THE APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTION AL RIGHTS AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION.
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The Utah Code Annotated 41-6-44.10 states, " ... If
such person has been requested to submit to any one of
the above chemical tests and refuses to submit to such
chemical test, the test shall not be given ... "Under this
statnte, then, the defendant was not to be forced into
t~1king such a test. The appellant contends that by informing him that if he refused to take the test his license
,,-ould be taken away he was, in reality, coerced into
taking the tPst. Such coercion would vitiate any such
c,ornwnt which would he necPssar>- to g-ivP snrh a test

Compton L State, Colo., 444 P. 2d 263 (1968) invoh-ed a similar state statute which provided, "no person
shall he required to take a blood alcohol test without his
eonsPnt." In that case the appellant moved to suppress
thP n•sults of the blood alcohol test and the court pointed
out, "it was propPr for the trial judge to resolve thP
rnatt(•r as to tlw 'voluntariness' of the hlood alcohol test
along the sanw proceclnral lines as would 1w followed in
d<'t<•rmining thP admissibility or nonadmissihility of a
confession." at 265. The court furth(~r explained that,
wrhP Prror of tlw trial court occurred when it thereafter
snhmittPd to tlw jur~- the results of the blood alcohol
t<>st without haxing first determinPd that consent to tl1P
taking of the test was ginm by the defendant." Thus,
lmde1' a similar statnte, it has lwen held that consent
mnst lw ohtai1wd and it must hP a "'·oluntary consPnt",
un lik~· tlw roPl'C<'d eonse>nt as in the cast> at bar. It is
tnw that ~von ran tab· a p<•rson's licPns<' away from hirn
ii' lw (l0<'s:1'• hk<· ilt<' lm•atl1 t<'sL 'T'h<' point lt<T<' is,
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rather, that by telling him he is going to lose his license
if he does not comply, most assuredly vitiates any "consent" to take one of the tests.
This case also involves a violation of the appellant's
constitutional rights against self-incrimination under the
Utah Constitution Article 1, Section 12 which states,
" ... The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence
against himself ... " (emphasis ours). This differs substantially from the United States Constitution, Fifth
Amendment which states, " ... nor shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself ... "
which is a near duplicate of the California Constitution
Article l, Section 13, Clause 5 which states, "nor be compelled in

an~Y

criminal proceeding to be a witness against

himself". Thus the Supreme Court of the United States
in SchmerlJer

t'.

California, 384 U.S. 757, 8G Sup. Ct.

182G, lG L. Ed. 2d 908 (19G6) was not considering a
statntt> such as that in Utah's Constitution and their
holding that a blood test does not fall under the category
being a "witness" against oneself (which implies only
the spoken word) is not binding in Utah since here he
cannot even be compelled to give "evidence" against
himself. However, the appellant in the case at bar was
compelled to give evidence against himself in violation
of the Utah Constitution since he was told by the arresting officPr that if lw did not take the tPst his license
would hP takPn away.
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Texas and Oklahoma, the two leading states in the
area of admissibility of compelled evidence of intoxication, both have constitutional articles like Utah's. The
Texas Constitution Article 1, Section 10 states, " ... He
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself
... " and the Oklahoma Constitution Article 2, Section 21
states, " ... No person shall be compelled to give evidence
that will tend to incriminate him ... " Both states have
genPrally held that tests to discern the degree of intoxicatfon in a person fall within the category of "evidence"
and if the evidence is not given freely, with knowledge
of his rights to refuse, such evidence may not be considPrl'd hy the conrt as, in any way, tending to show intoxieation of the defendant.
The leading Texas case of Apodaca v. State, 140
rr(•xCr.R. 593, 146 S."W. 2d 381 (1940) involved a urim·
te:-;t which ~was given to the defendant without his consl'nt. The conrt held that this was a violation of th(•
Texas Constitution Artcile 1, Section 10, supra, sinc 1 •
demonstration by an act or non-oral evidence involving
self-incrimination is as obnoxions to the constitution as
s0lf-incrimination hy words.
Sevr>ral cases have also ansen rn Oklahoma under
tlwir Constitntional Article 2, Section 21, supra. Cox

L

Sfafr, Okla. Cr., 39!5 P. 2d 054 (1904) involn>d two tests

givrn to the ddendant to asc(>rtain if he were under tlw
infhwnc<' of n lcol101. Tn tliat ease, tlw con rt poinh'd ont
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that the state constitutional provision against compelling
the accused to give evidence which will incriminate hjm
includes real as well as oral testimony. The court further stated that if it were found that the tests on the
defendant were not freely, knowingly, or voluntarily
made on the part of the defendant then the jury must
disregard such tests and results thereof as affording
any evidence against him. Spencer v. State, Okla. Cr.
404 P. 2d 46 (1965) and Stewart v. State Okla. Cr., 435
P. 2d 191 (1967) followed the Cox case where evidence
of films taken of the defendant while performing tests
under the direction of the police without the knowledge
or consent of the defendant was not allowed. In the case
at bar, where the appellant was coerced into taking the
breathalyzer test, the results should have been disregarded by the court. By using the tests as the primary
basis for a finding of driving while under the influence
of intoxicating liquor, prejudicial error was committed.

CONCLTTSTON
The conviction for driving under the influence of
intoxicating liquor should be reversed since prejudicial
error was committed in allowing the results of the
breathalyzer to be the basis of a conviction for "dnmk"
driving in this case. The results should have been disregarded for three basic reasons: A proper foundation
was not laid for the results of the breathal~'zer; the proseention failPd to extrapolate th0 rt>snlts hack to the time
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when the appellant was driving his automobile; and the
test was conducted only after the appellant was coerced
into taking it by a threat that his license would be taken
away if he didn't take the test-violating Utah Code
Ann. 41-6-44.10 and his rights against self incrimination
under the Utah Constitution. Thus, the conviction should
be reversed and this court should decide in this case of
first impression, that the breathalyzer test as conducted
in this case was inadmissible, invalid, and unconstitutional.
Respt>ctfnlly suhmitted,
MITSUN AG A & ROSS
Galen Ross
731 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for DefendantAppellant
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